Battle of Chamdo

Invasion of Tibet
Part of the Incorporation of Tibet into the People's Republic of China
Date October 1950
Location modern-day Qamdo Prefecture
Result
Belligerents
Tibet  People's Republic of China
Commanders and leaders
Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme (POW)[1] Mao Zedong
Liu Bocheng
Zhang Guohua
Fan Ming
Strength
Tibetan Army:[2] 8500[3] People's Liberation Army: 40,000[4][5]
Casualties and losses
5000 killed,[4] (Tibetan exile government claim)

180 killed or wounded[6][7][8] (Chinese government claim)

 114 killed or wounded[6]

The Battle of Chamdo, also referred to as the invasion of Tibet, was a military campaign by the People's Republic of China against a de facto independent Tibet in Qamdo after months of failed negotiations.[9] The purpose of the campaign was to capture the Tibetan army in Chamdo, demoralize the Lhasa government, and thus exert powerful pressure to send negotiators to Beijing to sign terms recognizing Chinese sovereignty over Tibet.[10] The campaign resulted in the Chinese capture of Qamdo,[6] and further negotiations between the PRC and Tibetan representatives, eventually resulting in the incorporation of Tibet into the People's Republic of China.

Contents

Negotiations between the Government of Tibet and the PRC prior to hostilities

On March 7, 1950, a Tibetan Government delegation arrived in Kalimpong to open a dialogue with the newly declared PRC and to secure assurances that the PRC would respect Tibetan “territorial integrity”, among other things. The onset of talks was delayed by debate between the Tibetan delegation, India, Britain, and the PRC about the location of the talks. Tibet favored Singapore or Hong Kong (not Beijing), Britain favored India (not Hong Kong or Singapore), India and the PRC favored Beijing, but India and Britain preferred no talks at all. The Tibetan delegation did eventually meet with the PRC’s ambassador General Yuan Zhongxian in Delhi on September 16, 1950. Yuan communicated a 3-point proposal that Tibet be regarded as part of China, that China be responsible for Tibet’s defense, and that China be responsible for Tibet’s trade and foreign relations. Acceptance would lead to peaceful "liberation", or otherwise war. The Tibetans undertook to maintain the relationship between China and Tibet as one of preceptor and patron, and their head delegate Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, on September 19th, recommended cooperation, with some stipulations about implementation. Chinese troops need not be stationed in Tibet, it was argued, since it was under no threat, and if attacked by India or Nepal could appeal to China for military assistance. While Lhasa deliberated, on October 7, Chinese troops advanced into eastern Tibet, crossing the de facto border[11] at 5 places. The purpose was not to invade Tibet per se but to capture the Tibetan army in Chamdo, demoralize the Lhasa government, and thus exert powerful pressure to send negotiators to Beijing to sign terms for a peaceful incorporation of Tibet.[10] On October 21, Lhasa instructed its delegation to leave immediately for Beijing for consultations with the Communist government, and to accept the first provision, if the status of the Dalai Lama could be guaranteed, while rejecting the other two conditions. It later rescinded even acceptance of the first demand, after a divination before the Six-Armed Mahākāla deities indicated that the three points could not be accepted, since Tibet would fall under foreign domination.[12][13][14]

Invasion of Kham region

Before the Communist takever, the relationship between the Khampa and the Dalai Lama's Government had deteriorated badly. As a result, the Khampa barely opposed or even joined the initial Communist assault on Chamdo. The People's Liberation Army had occupied Kham without much oppossition from the Khampa's. The relationship between the Khampa and the Tibetan Dalai Lama government in Lhasa was extremely poor at the time. Rapga offered the governor of Chamdo, Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, some Khampa fighters in exchange for the Tibetan government recognizing the independence of Kham. Ngabo refused the offer.

After the defeat of the Tibetan Army in Chamdo, Rapga started mediating in negotiations between the People's Liberation Army and the Tibetans.

Rapga and Topgay engaged in negotiations with the Chinese during their assault on Chamdo. Khampas either defected to the Chinese PLA forces or did not fight at all. The PLA succeeded in the invasion.[15]

Invasion of Tibet

After months of failed negotiations,[9] attempts by Tibet to secure foreign support and assistance,[16] and PRC[17] and Tibetan troop buildups, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) crossed the Jinsha River on 6 or 7 October.[18] Two PLA units quickly surrounded the outnumbered Tibetan forces and captured the border town of Qamdo by 19 October, by which time 114 PLA[6] soldiers and 180 Tibetan[6][7][8] soldiers had been killed or wounded (5,000 Tibetan soldiers died in battle according to Thomas Laird[4]). Active hostilities were limited to a border area controlled by the Government of Tibet northeast of the Gyamo Ngul Chu River and east of the 96th meridian.[19] After capturing Qamdo, the PLA broke off hostilities[20][7], sent a captured commander, Ngabo, to Lhasa to reiterate terms of negotiation, and waited for Tibetan representatives to respond through delegates to Beijing.[21]

Tibetan prisoners of war were generally well treated. After confiscating their weapons, the PLA soldiers gave the prisoners lectures on socialism and a small amount of money, before allowing them to return to their homes. According to Tenzin Gyatso, the current as well as the Dalai Lama of the time, the PLA did not attack civilians. [4]

Aftermath

Main article: Incorporation of Tibet into the People's Republic of China

The PLA sent released prisoners (among them Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme, a captured governor) to Lhasa to negotiate with the Dalai Lama on the PLA's behalf. Chinese broadcasts promised that if Tibet was "peacefully liberated", the Tibetan elites could keep their positions and power.[22] The Government of Tibet then sent representatives to Beijing to negotiate.

Altitude from China, 1950s

The government of PRC then defined the battle to be against "pro-Britain pro-Slavery separatist" 3th Taktra Ngawang Sungrab Thutob, "who is responsible for the death of Jamphel Yeshe Gyaltsen, the former teacher of Dalai Lama".[23]

Notes

  1. ^ Mackerras, Colin. Yorke, Amanda. The Cambridge Handbook of Contemporary China. [1991] (1991). Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521387558. p.100.
  2. ^ The Tibetan Army, Gyajong, was established according to the 29-point reform installed by Emperor Qianlong. See Goldstein, M.C., "The Snow Lion and the Dragon", p.20
  3. ^ Freedom in Exile: The Autobiography of the Dalai Lama, 14th Dalai Lama, London: Little, Brown and Co, 1990 ISBN 0-349-10462-X
  4. ^ a b c d Laird 2006, pp.301–307
  5. ^ Shakya 1999, p.43
  6. ^ a b c d e Jiawei Wang et Nima Gyaincain, The historical Status of China's Tibet, China Intercontinental Press, 1997, p.209 (see also The Local Government of Tibet Refused Peace Talks and the PLA Was Forced to Fight the Qamdo Battle, china.com.cn): "The Quamdo battle thus came to a victorious end on October 24, with 114 PLA soldiers and 180 Tibetan troops killed or wounded."
  7. ^ a b c Shakya 1999, p.45. Shakya also quotes PRC sources reporting 5738 enemy troops "liquidated" and over 5700 "destroyed". Shakya does not provide an estimate of PRC casualties.
  8. ^ a b Feigon 1996, p.144.
  9. ^ a b Shakya 1999 pp.28–32
  10. ^ a b Melvin C. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, vol.2, pp.48–9.
  11. ^ Melvin C. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet: The Calm Before the Storm: 1951–1955, University of California Press, 2009, Vol.2,p.48.
  12. ^ Shakya 1999 pp.27–32 (entire paragraph).
  13. ^ W. D. Shakabpa,One hundred thousand moons, BRILL, 2010 trans. Derek F. Maher, Vol.1, pp.916–917, and ch.20 pp.928–942, esp.pp.928–33.
  14. ^ Melvin C. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet: The Calm Before the Storm: 1951–1955, Vol.2, ibid.pp.41–57.
  15. ^ John Kenneth Knaus (2000). Orphans of the Cold War America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival (illustrated ed.). PublicAffairs. p. 71. ISBN 1891620851. http://books.google.com/books?id=FwaJCAU8mr8C&pg=PA71&dq=rapga+chinese&hl=en&ei=WI_FTdqrJoiugQeJxvnKBA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=6&ved=0CEcQ6AEwBQ#v=onepage&q=rapga%20chinese&f=false. Retrieved 12-27-2011. "Before the Chinese arrived, Rapga of the ubiquitous Pandatsang family had spent a few days in Chamdo in consultations with the governor. He slipped back across the river to the mountain stronghold where he and his brother Topgay waited. Ford, who continued to operate the radio and thus maintain Chamdo's only link to Lhasa, said it was generally believed that Rapga had gone to parley with the Chinese on behalf of the governor to delay the attack.4 If that was his mission, he was unsuccessful, but he and Topgay continued their ambiguous roles as resident middlemen in that area for the next several years. The Khampa clans on the other side of the river were yet to make common cause with their kinsmen, and they generally waited out the battle for Chamdo except for a few whom the Chinese had persuaded to join what would clearly be the winning side. . . The battle for Chamdo and the defense of Tibet was pitifully unequal but mercifully short . . .Some local Khampas, who had been recruited to augment the defense, turned to marauding when abandoned by the retreating governor. It was all over in less than two weeks." 
  16. ^ Shakya 1999 p.12,20,21
  17. ^ Feigon 1996 p.142. Shakya 1999 p.37.
  18. ^ Shakya 1999 p.32 (6 Oct). Goldstein 1997 p.45 (7 Oct).
  19. ^ Shakya 1999 map p.xiv
  20. ^ Goldstein 1997 p.45
  21. ^ Shakya 1999 p.49
  22. ^ Laird, 2006 p.306.
  23. ^ [1]

References

See also

Armed conflicts involving the People's Republic of China
Internal
Cross-Strait
vs Taiwan (ROC)
(after 1 Oct 1949)
External
vs USSR
vs USA and allies